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Past research has established a connection between regret (negative emotions 
connected to cognitions about how past actions might have achieved better out-
comes) and both depression and anxiety. in the present research, the relations 
between regret, repetitive thought, depression, and anxiety were examined in 
a nationally representative telephone survey. although both regret and repeti-
tive thought were associated with general distress, only regret was associated 
with anhedonic depression and anxious arousal. Further, the interaction between 
regret and repetitive thought (i.e., repetitive regret) was highly predictive of gen-
eral distress but not of anhedonic depression nor anxious arousal. these relations 
were strikingly consistent across demographic variables such as sex, race/ethnic-
ity, age, education, and income. 
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 “If only I had told her I love her!” the aching remorse of actions left 
undone, of better possibilities left unattained, is a universal emo-
tion. Regret may be defined as a negative emotion colored by the in-
ference that a personal action might have brought about a different, 
more desirable outcome (i.e., a counterfactual inference). a growing 
body of research has demonstrated regret to be a pivotal psycho-
logical construct, of relevance to decisions, coping, and learning (in-
man, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Zeelenberg & pieters, 2007). Recent evidence 
has linked regret to depression and anxiety. however, repetitive 
thought (defined as chronic, repeated thinking about a particular 
object) has also been linked to depression and anxiety. Because re-
gret may overlap with repetitive thought (people may focus repeat-
edly on a particular regret), a key question centers on the extent to 
which regret versus repetitive thought contribute independently or 
interactively to depression and anxiety. we examined this question 
in a nationally representative telephone survey, which yielded the 
first portrait of how the typical american experiences life regrets.
Regret is often conceptualized in terms of two components, a 
negative affective state and a counterfactual inference that involves 
self-blame (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; landman, 1993). in oth-
er words, the cognitive construction of an alternative decision (i 
should have taken the shortcut) or life pathway (i could have been 
a contender) suggests some degree of fault: one should have known 
better and acted to have achieved a better outcome (Roese, 1997). 
although this definition of regret emphasizes its negative side, re-
cent research has demonstrated that its psychological consequences 
may involve benefit as well as harm. 
one benefit is that regret can help to gain insight and improve 
performance. Regret signals a need for corrective action and pushes 
people into implementing those actions. in this sense, regret is often 
a normal component of learning from experience (galinsky, seiden, 
Kim, & medvec, 2002; Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & 
pieters, 1999), and is particularly likely to be felt when the individu-
al recognizes opportunities for corrective action (Roese & summer-
ville, 2005). moreover, the experience of regret has been linked to 
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et 
al., 2006; ursu & Carter, 2005), a brain region involved in learning, 
deciding, and planning; e.g., Bechara, Damasio, & Danasio, 2000; 
Beer, Knight, & D’esposito, 2006). From this perspective, then, re-
gret has beneficial consequences.
the more traditional view of regret, however, is that it brings neg-
ative consequences. Regret has been conceptualized as a form of 
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bias in decision-making, resulting in suboptimal choices (Connolly 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Roese, 1999). most 
important for the present research, regret has been linked to mental 
health outcomes such as depression and anxiety. For example, mon-
roe, skowronski, macDonald, & wood, (2005) assessed regret in the 
context of a mock job hiring task, in terms of the extent to which 
individuals expressed regret after learning that a better candidate 
might have been hired instead of the one they themselves recom-
mended. mildly depressed participants reported stronger regret 
than nondepressed participants, and this effect was independent 
of the personal relevance of the decision and the actual differences 
in the quality of the candidates (see also markman & weary, 1996; 
markman & miller, 2006). Kocovski, endler, Rector, & Flett (2005) 
found that counterfactual thinking (which, as we have noted, is the 
cognitive underpinning of regret) was related to social anxiety (see 
also leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006). 
one aspect that may distinguish between beneficial versus prob-
lematic regret is whether regrets are repetitive. Repetitive thought 
is a broad and widely used construct in psychology that refers to 
“the process of thinking attentively, repetitively, or frequently 
about one’s self and one’s social world” (segerstrom, stanton, al-
den, & Craske, 2003, p. 909; see watkins, 2008, for review).1 gen-
erally speaking, repetitive thought that focuses on negative ide-
ation is associated both with depression and anxiety (e.g., Ciesla & 
Roberts, 2007; Cox, enns, & taylor, 2001; nolen-hoeksema, 2000; 
nolen-hoeksema, wisco, & lyubomirsky, 2008; segerstrom, tsao, 
alden, & Craske, 2000). how might regret be related to repetitive 
thought? we conceptualize them as distinct but overlapping con-
structs. accordingly, there may be (1) regret that is not repetitive 
(e.g., a momentary pang of regret over ordering coffee instead of 
tea), (2) repetitive thought that contains no regret (i.e., no consider-
ation of counterfactual alternatives, as when mentally replaying the 
factual aspects of one’s honeymoon), and (3) repetitive regret, which 
involves the same regrets repeatedly coming to mind (e.g., wishing 
over and over to have married one’s high school sweetheart). Re-
petitive regret thus involves a repeated focus on self-blaming “what 
1. we use the term repetitive thought (as per watkins, 2008), but acknowledge 
that other researchers have used the term rumination to convey a similar meaning. 
Rumination has been defined in terms of thought processes that are repetitive but also 
self-focused and oriented toward negative emotions (nolen-hoeksema, 2000; nolen-
hoeksema, wisco, & lyubomirsky, 2008).
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might have been” thoughts, and thus comprises a recurring brew of 
cognition and negative affect. we suggest that this new construct of 
repetitive regret is a particularly important marker for distress. that 
is, regret might be an “active ingredient,” or catalyst, that amplifies 
the previously observed relation between repetitive thought and 
distress. in the present research, we measured both regret and re-
petitive thought so as to test whether they have independent and/
or interactive associations with depression and anxiety. 
in addressing these questions, the present research was structured 
around the tripartite model proposed by Clark and watson (1991), 
in which the overlap between depression and anxiety is character-
ized by 3 symptom groups. First, general distress refers to aspects 
that are nonspecific, or common to both depression and anxiety, 
and centers mainly on the presence of negative affective symptoms. 
second, anhedonic depression is defined in terms of the absence 
of positive affective experiences and disinterest in the pleasures of 
daily life; it is specific to depression but not anxiety. third, anxious 
arousal refers to the somatic aspects of anxiety (e.g., shortness of 
breath, dry mouth, trembling) that are less evident in depression. 
measurement of these factors has been achieved using the 90-item 
mood and anxiety symptom Questionnaire (masQ), which has 
been validated in several studies (Clark & watson, 1991; watson et 
al., 1995). Because of the cost and time constraints involved in the 
present research, however, we used a briefer version of this scale 
(mini-masQ, Casillas & Clark, 2000). whereas previous research 
on the relations of regret and repetitive thought to depression and 
anxiety has relied on samples of convenience, the present research 
was a nationally representative telephone survey, thus permitting 




the sample consisted of 370 adult americans. Respondents were 
told at first screening that they would receive a $5 honorarium for 
completing the interview. Respondents gave oral informed consent 
to participate in this research. their name and address were col-
lected at the conclusion of the survey and a $5 bill was mailed to 
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them within 2 weeks of completing the questionnaire (27.5% of re-
spondents refused the honorarium). 
the response rate (the proportion of the eligible respondents who 
completed the interview) was 20.5%. the refusal rate (the propor-
tion of the eligible respondents who either refused to complete or 
for some reason broke off an interview) was 49.1%. the response 
and refusal rates were calculated in accordance with guidelines 
specified by the american association of public opinion Research 
(aapoR), which has attempted to provide standardization of for-
mula and definitions (and hence comparability across surveys) in 
the aapoR Standard Definitions. we calculated the response and re-
fusal rates using aapoR’s most widely accepted definitions, RR3 
and ReF2, respectively (see aapoR, 2008).
pRoCeDuRe
the survey used a simple random sample, conducted by telephone. 
the survey was completed by the survey Research laboratory, an 
independent commercial research unit affiliated with the univer-
sity of illinois that has, since 1964, specialized in conducting sur-
vey research of the highest caliber. the population of interest was 
adults aged 18 and over in the contiguous united states. to identify 
a representative sample of the adult u.s. population, three widely 
accepted methodological techniques were used: random-digit di-
aling, within-household sampling, and sample weighting (Fowler, 
2002). 
Random-Digit Dialing. the survey used a random-digit-dial de-
sign. this technique, which involves using a random number gen-
erator to specify the phone numbers to be “dialed,” is able to identi-
fy unlisted as well as listed phone numbers, and thus is considered 
superior to methods based on selection from phone books (potthoff, 
1994). a representative sample may be realized via this method be-
cause every american with access to telephone service has an equal 
chance of being contacted.2 once contact was made with a phone 
number/household, one respondent from within that household 
was sampled from among all eligible respondents. 
Within-Household Sampling. in households in which more than one 
adult was eligible, the respondent was selected using the troldahl-
Carter-Bryant method. this method is a widely accepted technique 
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for systematically (as opposed to randomly) selecting respondents 
from households so as to attain better representativeness (e.g., Czaja, 
Blair, & sebestik, 1982). the likelihood of error due to within-house-
hold noncoverage is minimized because all eligible respondents in 
a household are considered equally. in this method, the respondent 
is asked how many adults are in the household and how many of 
those are women. using one of four matrices, the interviewer se-
lects a respondent based on the 2x2 matrix that crosses sex and age 
(e.g., the youngest man, the oldest woman, etc). the matrix frequen-
cies were modified to ensure greater selection of older men, because 
women more often act as household gatekeepers and men tend to 
be less agreeable to interviews than women. 
Sample Weighting. to improve further the representativeness of 
our conclusions, the data from each respondent were weighted by 
specific demographic characteristics. that is, the sex, race, and age 
of our obtained sample were compared to u.s. Census figures. if a 
demographic group were over- or under-represented in our sample, 
a compensatory correction weight makes individual respondents 
from those groups contribute less or more, respectively, to the de-
scriptive statistical conclusions (Fowler, 2002). 
the weights were calculated in two stages. First, the data were ad-
justed so that the time zone distribution of the completed interviews 
corresponded to the distribution in the overall sample of contacted 
households, thereby adjusting for minor differences in refusal rate 
across time zones. second, the marginal distributions of sex, race, 
and age were adjusted to conform to the marginal distributions of 
those variables in the 2000 u.s. Census. this resulted in the gen-
eration of a single omnibus weight for each individual participant, 
which were used in all analyses reported. 
to summarize, this simple random sample survey design made 
use of three standard and widely used techniques designed to se-
cure a representative sample: random-digit dialing, within-house-
hold sampling, and sample weighting.
Interviews. interviews were conducted by telephone, with a mean 
duration of 21 mins. interviews were computer-assisted, and used 
the Computer assisted survey execution system (Cases) pro-
gramming language. this procedure allowed the survey data to 
be entered by the interviewer into a notebook computer as it was 
2. as of 2007, 88.4% of americans have access to telephone service (Belinfante, 2008).
RegRet anD mental HealtH 677
asked (thus eliminating the need for subsequent data entry) and 
also ensured that questions that were not relevant to the respon-
dent were skipped automatically. most interviewing was conduct-
ed on weekday evenings and weekends to increase the chance of 
successful contact with respondents. a maximum of twenty contact 
attempts were made, at different times of day and on different days 
of the week, before finalizing a case as noncontact. in the case of 
refusals, two callbacks were made at a later time by an interviewer 
experienced at refusal conversion to increase the probability of co-
operation.
measuRes
Regret was measured with a 6-item scale (α = .65) validated via pre-
testing with undergraduate students. Repetitive thought was mea-
sured using a 3-item scale (α = .65), with items selected on the basis 
of item-total correlations in the data set reported in segerstrom et 
al. (2003). these items were selected in particular for their neutrality 
with regard to thought content and thought valence. Both the regret 
and repetitive thought scales had 5 response options ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree (see appendix for items). 
three mental health variables were assessed (scales from Casillas 
& Clark, 2000): general distress (8 items, α = .83), anhedonic de-
pression (8 items, α = .88), and anxious arousal (10 items, α = .79). 
some examples of the items comprising these scales are as follows, 
written in the telegraphic form that appeared on the interviewers’ 
computer-assisted questionnaire interface: general distress (e.g., 
past week, how often felt hopeless; past week, how often felt dis-
couraged); anhedonic depression (e.g., past week, how often felt 
nothing was enjoyable; past week, how often felt having a lot of fun 
[reverse-scored]); anxious arousal (e.g., past week, how often felt 
short of breath; past week, how often felt yourself shaking). all 3 
mental health variables used a 5-point response scale with the fol-
lowing options: never, rarely, sometimes, frequently, and always.
Respondents also gave information regarding the following de-
mographic characteristics: race/ethnicity, age, education, and in-
come. 
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Results
all analyses were conducted using standardized scores. not sur-
prisingly, the mental health variables were positively skewed (i.e., 
most people clustered at the low end of these scales); analyses were 
therefore conducted using the log-transformed scores so as to cor-
rect for nonnormality. analyses were conducted using weighted (by 
sex, race, and age) standardized scores to enhance the representa-
tiveness of conclusions.
the zero-order correlations among the primary measures are de-
picted in table 1. Consistent with Casillas and Clark (2000), general 
distress was substantially related to both anhedonic depression (r 
= .53, p < .001) and anxious arousal (r = .54, p < .001), but the lat-
ter two were more modestly related (r = .25, p < .001). Regret and 
repetitive thought were correlates as well, r = .41, p < .001. Regret 
and repetitive thought are conceptually distinct, and this moderate 
correlation indicates that some people are regretful without repeti-
tiveness, some are repetitive without being regretful, yet still others 
do both. the next analyses examined the interactive effects of regret 
and repetitive thought.
separate analyses were conducted on general distress, anhedo-
nic depression, and anxious arousal, with each regression model 
involved entry of regret and repetitive thought at the first step, then 
entry of the interaction term at the second step (see table 2 for sum-
mary). For the general distress model (adjusted R2 = .25), all three 
predictors were significant: regret, standardized B = .31, t = 5.98, p < 
.001, R2 = .12; repetitive thought, B = .20, t = 3.93, p < .001, R2 = .12; 
interaction, B = .18, t = 3.98, p < .001. For the anhedonic depression 
model (adjusted R2 = .16), regret was the only significant predictor 
(B = .38, t = 6.93, p < .001). For anxious arousal, (adjusted R2 = .11), 
both regret and repetitive thought, but not their interaction term, 
were significant predictors: regret, B = .21, t = 3.76, p < .001; repeti-
tive thought, B = .15, t = 2.68, p = .008; interaction, B = .08, t = 1.64, 
p = .10. 
thus, regret was associated with general distress, anhedonic de-
pression, and anxiety, even when controlling for repetitive thought. 
By contrast, repetitive thought was uniquely associated with gener-
al distress and anxious arousal, but not with anhedonic depression. 
of greatest interest, the interaction between regret and repetitive 
thought was associated with a particularly sharp increase in general 
distress, but not with anhedonic depression nor anxious arousal. 
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past research showed that women engage in more (negatively 
valenced) repetitive thought than men (e.g., Butler & nolen-hoek-
sema, 1994), but are not more regretful overall than men (Roese et 
al., 2006). in our sample, women scored higher than men in both 
regret and repetitive thought, F(1, 368) = 3.37, 5.95, ps = .07, .02, η2 = 
.02, .009. Consistent with previous research (e.g., nolen-hoeksema, 
1987), women reported greater general distress, anhedonic depres-
sion, and anxious arousal than did men, F(1, 368) = 9.98, 13.1, 16.5, 
all ps < .002, η2 = .03, .04, .007. these main effects are summarized 
in table 3. importantly, neither regret nor repetitive thought medi-
ated the sex differences in mental health variables (i.e., the relations 
were unchanged by inclusion of regret and repetitive thought as 
covariates).3 we further tested whether the relations between regret, 
repetitive thought, and the mental health outcomes were qualified 
by sex of respondent. this was done by assessing each of general 
distress, anhedonic depression, and anxious arousal in separate re-
gressions, with regret, sex, and the regret by sex interaction term 
entered as predictors. similar models were constructed to test the 
repetitive thought by sex interaction. the interaction term was not 
significant in any of these tests. thus, the basic pattern of relations 
involving mental health outcomes held for both women and men, 
even though women tended to score higher than men as a back-
ground main effect.
taBle 1. Correlations and Descriptive statistics
1 2 3 4 5
1. Regret —
2. Repetitive thought .41** —
3. General distress .44** .37** —
4. anhedonic depression .41** .23** .53** —
5. anxious arousal .30** .26** .54** .25** —
Cronbach’s α .65 .65 .84 .88 .79
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 3.67 4.00 4.63 5.00 3.50
M 2.17 2.42 1.83 2.27 1.49
SD .42 .53 .71 .75 .52
Note. *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed. degrees of freedom for all correlations was 370.
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a representative sample affords the opportunity to examine 
whether the main findings consistently appear across the follow-
ing demographic variables: race/ethnicity, age, education, and in-
come. in general, our main findings were consistent across these 
variables. Beginning with race/ethnicity, our representative sample 
for the most part mirrored the race and ethnic breakdowns of the 
united states. however, our sample under-represented asians (n = 
5) and american indians (n = 7), hence these groups were left out of 
the race/ethnicity analysis. sufficient sample sizes were available, 
however, to test whether the pattern of relations involving mental 
health outcomes held among african americans (n = 33) and his-
panic americans (n = 21), as benchmarked against white partici-
pants (n = 301). no race/ethnicity main effects were found among 
the variables of regret, repetitive thought, general distress, anhedo-
nic depression, and anxious arousal. using the same strategy as for 
testing sex of respondent as a moderating variable, separate analy-
ses to test the race/ethnicity interaction term revealed no significant 
effects. thus, the same pattern of relations involving regret, repeti-
tive thought, and the mental health variables was evident among 
african americans, hispanic americans, and hispanic americans.
as a zero-order correlation, age was negatively associated with 
repetitive thought (B = -.19, t = -3.65, p < .001) but not regret (B 
= -.04, t = -.82, p = .41). that is, older americans reported less re-
petitive thought than younger americans, yet did not differ from 
3. with regard to the sex difference involving both regret and rumination, we 
recognize that interpretation of anCova results may be problematic when the 
independent variables differ on the covariate (miller & Chapman, 2001). in the present 
case, however, inclusion of the covariates did not alter the main finding. if inclusion of 
covariates substantially changed the result, then interpretation of this change would be 
ambiguous.  
taBle 2. Relations Between Regret, Repetitive thought, and mental Health variables
interaction
Repetitive (Repetitive
Regret thought Regret) R2
General distress .31** .20* .18** .25
anhedonic depression .38** .05 .02 .16
anxious arousal .21** .15 .08 .11
Note. Values are standardized betas; columns indicate predictor variables entered into 3 models cor-
responding to rows.  *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed. the degrees of freedom (residual) for 
all three models was 366.
RegRet anD mental HealtH 681
younger americans in their regret experiences. age was associated 
with both general distress and with anhedonic depression. older 
americans reported fewer symptoms of general distress, B = -.17, t 
= -3.53 p < .001, but more symptoms of anhedonic depression, B = 
.12, t = 2.47, p = .02. age was not related to anxious arousal, B = -.08, 
t = -1.50, p = .13. again using the same strategy as described above, 
separate analyses were run to test the age interaction term. in no 
case was the interaction term significant, thus age of respondent did 
not moderate any of the main findings.
higher levels of education corresponded to lower levels of regret 
(B = -.29, t = -5.74, p < .001), and lower levels of repetitive thought 
(B = -.20, t = -3.84, p < .001). although education was unrelated to 
general distress and anhedonic depression, it was associated with 
reduced anxiety (B = -.23, t = -4.58, p < .001). education qualified the 
main findings in only one respect: with decreasing levels of educa-
tion, regret became a more powerful predictor of distress (interac-
tion B = -.14, t = -2.99, p = .003). one way of interpreting this pattern 
is that higher education buffers against the depressogenic effect of 
regret. overall, however, the general pattern of relations among re-
gret, repetitive thought, and the mental health variables held at all 
levels of education.
lower income was associated with higher levels of regret (B = 
-.41, t = -8.10, p < .001), Rt, (B = -.23, t = -4.32, p < .001), general dis-
tress (B = -.15, t = -2.69, p = .008), anxious arousal, (B = -.20, t = -3.77, 
p < .001), but not with anhedonic depression (p = .09). as with the 
other demographic variables, variation in income did not qualify 
any of the main findings. 
taBle 3. sex Differences in Regret, Repetitive thought, and the mental Health variables
Women men η2 p
Regret 2.22 2.12 .02 .02
Repetitive thought 2.48 2.38 .009 .07
General distress 1.87 1.67 .03 .002
anhedonic depression 2.31 2.05 .03 <.001
anxious arousal 1.59 1.38 .04 <.001
Note.  the mental health variables were positively skewed, hence analysis of sex differences was 
conducted using log-transformed scores (two-tailed).  the means presented here are untransformed 
(degrees of freedom for all tests was 368).
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DisCussion
past research has demonstrated connections between regret and re-
petitive thought on the one hand, and mental health variables such 
as depression and anxiety on the other. the present findings ex-
plored these relations in a representative national sample, with re-
sponses obtained via telephone interview. the research was guided 
by the tripartite model (Clark & watson, 1991; watson et al., 1995), 
in which the overlap between depression and anxiety is explained 
in terms of a general (nonspecific) distress factor, but also two rela-
tively independent factors corresponding to anhedonia (specific to 
depression) and anxious arousal (specific to general anxiety). al-
though there was overlap between regret and repetitive thought 
(i.e., they were correlated), they nevertheless showed distinct pat-
terns of relations to the mental health variables. Both were associ-
ated with general distress. Regret but not repetitive thought was 
associated with anhedonic depression, and regret but not repetitive 
thought was associated with anxious arousal. Because we used a re-
gression approach in which regret and repetitive thought were en-
tered as simultaneous predictors, we were able to test whether the 
previously established links between regret and depression (e.g., 
markman & miller, 2006; monroe et al., 2005) could be explained 
by the link between repetitive thought and depression (e.g., nolen-
hoeksema, 2000; segerstrom et al., 2000), or vice versa. From table 
2, it is clear that in no case did repetitive thought explain away the 
relation of regret to mental health variables: regret was always a sig-
nificant predictor even when repetitive thought was included in the 
model. By contrast, the same was not true for repetitive thought: it 
predicted general distress significantly and independently of regret, 
but explained no further variation in anhedonic depression nor in 
anxious arousal when regret was included in the model. 
most interesting of all, the interaction between regret and repeti-
tive thought (which we termed repetitive regret) was highly pre-
dictive of general distress. as depicted in Figure 1, when repetitive 
thought is lower, regret only modestly predicts distress, but when 
repetitive thought is higher, regret is much more highly predictive 
of distress. stated somewhat differently, the combination of regret 
and repetitive thought is particularly predictive of distress. Repeti-
tive regret was not related, however, to anhedonic depression nor 
anxious arousal. our conceptualization of repetitive regret centers 
on the experience of having the same specific regrets coming re-
peatedly to mind (e.g., wishing repeatedly that one had married 
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her high school sweetheart). Repetitive regret thus involves a recur-
ring focus on both the negative affect aspect and the self-blaming 
what might have been aspect of regret. the present findings suggest 
that the new construct of repetitive regret is particularly important 
for future research examining the cognitive antecedents of mental 
health.
the recent literature indicates that regret (and counterfactual 
thinking) is not merely dysfunctional (in terms of exacerbating 
biases or errors, e.g., Roese, 1999; Roese & maniar, 1997), but also 
offers psychological benefits in terms of signaling the presence of 
problems and stimulating learning from experience (epstude & Ro-
ese, 2008; saffrey, summerville, & Roese, 2008; Zeelenberg & piet-
ers, 2007). indeed, the absence of regret (or, more specifically, the 
absence of counterfactual thinking) has been associated with other 
mental disorders, such as schizophrenia (hooker, Roese, & park, 
2000; Roese, park, smallman, & gibson, 2008). that is, the inability 
to form what might have been cognitions contributes to the impair-
FiguRe 1. interaction Between Regret and Repetitive thought in 
predicting general Distress 
Note. this figure depicts the interaction between regret and repetitive 
thought in predicting general distress. all scale values are standardized. 
higher versus lower repetitive thought, and higher versus lower regret, 
correspond to one standard deviation above and below the mean, 
respectively. the positive relation between regret and general distress is 
greater when it involves high as opposed to low repetitive thought.
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ment in problem-solving and hence social dysfunction widely ob-
served in schizophrenia. the present finding of an interaction be-
tween regret and repetitive thought may provide a clue for when 
regret is a springboard to effective problem solving versus leading 
individuals down the dark alleys of distress. Repetitive regret is, we 
suggest, the subtype of regret most associated with negative mental 
health consequences.
the findings overall were strikingly consistent across americans 
from different backgrounds and life circumstances. with few excep-
tions, the connection between regret and mental health variables 
was similar across sex, race/ethnicity, age, education, and, income. 
By examining a representative sample, the present conclusions find-
ings may be generalized to a far broader cross-section of ameri-
cans than was possible in previous research on regret and repeti-
tive thought. with regard to sex differences, one surprising finding 
emerged. women were found to engage in repetitive thought more 
than did men, and women scored higher than men on all three men-
tal health variables (replicating Butler & nolen-hoeksema, 1994). 
Further, women reported greater regret than men, contradicting 
other research (e.g., Roese et al., 2006). nevertheless, irrespective of 
this main effect, it was striking that same pattern of inter-relations 
among regret, repetitive thought, and mental health variables was 
evident within women and men.
our findings were consistent with past research on age differences 
in regret (wrosch, Dunne, scheier, & schulz, 2006; wrosch & heck-
hausen, 2002), but the present research found an interesting differ-
ence between regret and repetitive thought for older adults. that 
is, older adults were more likely to engage in repetitive thought 
than younger adults, yet there was no difference as a function of 
age in reports of regret. this finding underscores the need in fu-
ture research to consider age-related patterns of regret and repeti-
tive thought and their impact on well-being separately. theoretical 
implications for a general life-span theory of regret would certainly 
be shaped by such considerations (cf. heckhausen & schulz, 1995; 
King & hicks, 2007).
it is important to recognize that the correlational nature of this re-
search precludes assignment of causal direction. we have assumed 
(based on prior studies), that repetitive regret causes vulnerability 
to depression, the onset of which might be interactively prompted 
by other, more immediate stressors. however, it is no less compel-
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ling to consider the reverse causal direction. For example, a genetic 
predisposition to suffer from general distress might bring about an 
increase in repetitive regret. moreover, both causal directions may 
co-occur, unleashing a vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing deterio-
rations of mental health.
to conclude, we found that although regret and repetitive thought 
predict different facets of depression and anxiety, their overlap (re-
petitive regret) was highly predictive of general distress. impor-
tantly, this research builds on previous findings by confirming these 
relations in a nationally representative sample. Regret seems to be 
a key ingredient that amplifies the connection between repetitive 
thought and general distress, and this finding holds promise for 
understanding when regret is the catalyst for new insights or the 
trigger for general distress. if future research confirms that regret is 
indeed an amplifier of the repetitive thought-distress relationship, 
one potential implication is that mental health professionals should 
focus their therapies on diminishing repetitive thought so the posi-
tive aspects of regret on learning can flourish.
appenDix
RegRet Scale 
i regret a lot of my actions.
wish could live parts of my life over
i think “if only” a lot
prefer to focus on future than the past*
Rarely think what “might have been”*
like to approach life with “no regrets”*
RepetItIve tHougHt 
often playing back in mind past actions
easy to put unwanted thoughts out of mind
always seem to rehash things said/done
Note: * reverse scored
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